The connection between modernization and social acceleration is now a prominent theme in critical social analysis. Taking a cue from these debates, I explore attempts that aim to 'slow down modernity' by resisting the dynamic tempo of various social processes and experiences. The issue of slowdown now accounts for a largely unquestioned measure, expected to deliver unhasty tempo conditioning good and ethical life, mental well-being and accountable democracy. In principle, there is little to object to in such well-intended goals. This paper, nonetheless, identifies several problems associated with slowdown, especially if presented as an incontestable doctrine. Despite its progressive feel, slowdown also stands for 1) a capitalist commodity; 2) a dangerous political objective that weaves together parochialism with fear-driven social sentiment; and 3) an undesired subjective experience. Finally, I evaluate recent propositions around 'accelerationism' and ask whether they might tackle the pitfalls of both social acceleration and slowness. I conclude by arguing that neither slow nor fast can be preferred as universal solutions.
2 occupying an auxiliary position, are now understood as self-standing phenomena which are distinctively relevant and important in their own right. Rosa (2013) , to take a pioneering scholarship in this regard, offers a theory of social acceleration as a primary conceptual model and an explanatory instrument conductive to understanding the contradictory dynamic of modernization. Given that the constitution of modern societies and modern social processes are fundamentally temporal in nature, Rosa also uses his theoretical model for re-interpreting modernity as such; notably, the critique of acceleration comprises a strong component of his innovative theoretical scheme. Underpinning his critique is the main argument that the structural force of social acceleration lurks behind new forms of alienation, anomies and multiple socio-psychological pathologies as well as dysfunctionalities.
Rosa's 'social acceleration thesis' (for a detailed critical discussion see Vostal 2014b) attracted important commentaries taking issue with its accuracy, character, foundations and epochalist nature (Archer 2014a , Savage 2014 , Wajcman 2015 ).
Rosa's theory is thereby often assigned the status of a 'zeitgeistological' sociological grid that allegedly disregards stability, fixity and 'freeze' of specific aspects inherent to modern capitalist logic.
Reflecting on Piketty's (2014) bestseller, Savage notes that 'there is actually a remarkable and enduring regularity which needs to be placed at the forefront of our understanding of contemporary -as much as classical -capitalism. Nothing much has changed, and in fact we are becoming rather more like our Victorian forebears than was the case fifty years ago' (Savage 2014: 598 ). Yet Rosa's assessment of the role of capitalist logic in the formation of social acceleration does not divert from Savage's position in any substantial sense: 'In the system of the capitalist economic system acceleration becomes an inescapable compulsion embedded in the material structures 3 of society' (Rosa 2013: 161 ; see also Glezos 2012) . From a temporal perspective, there are numerous regularities and immanent features integral to the capitalist system(s) that remain unchecked since Marx's and Weber's treatments (see e.g. Sayer 1991 ). Sewell in this respect notes: '[I]n spite of the birth and death of firms and industries, the transformations in technology, the development of ever more sophisticated financial instruments, the greatly increased capacity of states and repeated shifts in economic policy regimes, there is some central mechanism of capitalism that has remained essentially unchanged for a century and a half ' (2008: 520) . Notwithstanding the growing direct and indirect critical and empirical engagements with Rosa's theory of social acceleration (e.g. Schöneck 2015 ), Sewell's observation is important. It points to a fundamental attribute of Rosa's work which might often escape his critics who tend to highlight the epochalist and determinist features of social acceleration thesis, or sometimes even its fashionability, which will soon expire. Rosa states, similarly to Sewell, that acceleration is in fact an inherently conservative aspect of capitalism. Drawing on Offe, Rosa notes that the 'one characteristic that has existed as an unchanging "essence" or "formation trait" throughout all historical epochs and cultural appearances of capitalism and which therefore should be included in its definitions is that specific, peculiar, fatal connection of growth and acceleration, that "bicycle principle" of capitalist accumulation: either the process of circulation occurs at high and increasing speeds, or the system "falls over"' (Rosa 2015: 77-8, emphasis original) . The important remark that acceleration is a standard integral component of (capitalist) modernity, that it is something not extraordinary, remains rather sidelined in contemporary debates around the theme, which often account for acceleration as new structural process significantly co-shaping capitalist formations. It is, however, necessary to 4 stress that the acceleration imperative is not one-dimensional: it is intertwined with both liberatory and progressive promises of modernity (Koselleck 2004 In a discursive sense, speed, in modern society, continues to be both valorized not only as a propellant of the capitalist dynamic (Glezos 2012: 85ff) but also through the connection with arch-modern ideas of progress or as a virtue associated with wit and intelligence (see Collins 2014: 54-55 In the remainder of this article I argue that the present conceptions of slowness, the modes of reasoning underpinning it and the emerging forms of slowness are problematic because the slow is not necessarily the equivalent of poise, deliberation, long termism, duration, maturing, and consequently human betterment.
The key point I will make can be outlined as follows: while speed up (as, for instance, an involuntary reaction to time-pressure) is undoubtedly a significant social and psychological issue, 'going slow' -as presently conceived -does not account for 6 viable solution to the pathologies of social acceleration nor does it account for an instrument bypassing the present capitalist constellation. I would like to offer three provisional, but nevertheless supportive critical points for this argument: first, I will show that slowness can actually be conceptualized as an exploitable commodity in contemporary capitalism; second, I will highlight the problematic relationship between slowness and localism; and third, I will briefly look at slowness as an undesired human experience. Finally, I briefly assess recent propositions surrounding 'accelerationism' and ask whether they might tackle the pitfalls of both social acceleration and deceleration.
The agenda of the slow
Thinking about social slowness as a distinctive theme in the social and human sciences is rare (for notable exceptions see Parkins & Craig 2006; Osbaldiston 2013a; Koepnick 2015 ) and on such occasions the defence of slowness is often counterpoised against the objective or supposed acceleration of social life: 'People are reacting against "fast capitalism" in a way which embraces meaningful or even authentic relations with environment, people and the self' (Osbaldiston 2013b: 11) . This is not such a surprising logic, already identified by Rosa and scholars who investigate his 'social acceleration thesis' in specific social environments (see Korunka & Hoonaker 2014; Müller 2014; Vostal 2015b His recent criticism of society's alleged en masse obsession with 'quick fixes' is as follows:
Everywhere you look -health, politics, education, relationship, business, diplomacy, finance, the environment -the problems we face are more complex and more pressing than ever before. Piss-poor performance is no longer an option. The time has come to resist the siren call of half-baked solution and short-term palliative and start fixing properly. We need to find a new and better way to tackle every kind of problem. We need to learn the art of the Slow Fix (Honoré 2013: 11-12) . Yet, slow initiatives seem to, more often than not, 'sell' slowness rather than provide it as an intellectual or educative compound or as a democratic space of practices resisting the escalatory logic of modernity (Rosa 2014: 43) . Slowness: for sale 5 Indeed, attempts to revolt against/resist social speed are not unique to late modernity. Walter Benjamin, for instance, famously noted how mid nineteenth-century flâneurs resisted the increasing pace of modern life by taking turtles -to set a slow pace -for walks in the streets of Paris. 6 However, I am not ready to strictly deny the utopian potential of some slow initiatives that might operate outside and against the logic of capitalist subsumption. Hence, slow living is now 'for sale' and approaches a consumerist lifestyle mostly for middle-class metropolitan dwellers -the majority of whom are probably far from holding transformative, progressivist or even socialist agendas. Arguably, many would admit that 'it all needs to slow down', but such slowness would then be, more often than not, consumed, and consumed privately. Archer (2014b: 5) is correct when she says that '"downsizing" and "downshifting" to a slower pace of life are (adopted from https://www.slow-watches.com/the-brand). However, slow watches proved to be rather useless for my time organization as when I wanted to know what time it was exactly I never managed to capture it and had to check my mobile phone (not to mention the tiny size of the digits). As a result slow watches become rather impractical in modern societies where clock-time reading is a universal coordinating and scheduling mechanism.
appear as paradoxically integral parts of such fast capitalism, which many critical theorists identify as the sole driver of social acceleration (Koepnick 2015: 2-3 
Parochial slowness
The second variant of my critique deals with the relationship between localism and slowness and is qualitatively different from the one above, but there will be occasional overlap. Also, my understanding of localism is different from the dominant conceptions that often relate slowness and localism in progressive and salutary ways (Carp 2012; Saward 2015) . The critique I offer partially draws on neo-vitalist approaches by Connolly (2002) and Glezos (2012) who note that slowness can actually be an integral component of a brand of particular populist folk politics, which is stressing nationhood, (quasi-)religious purity and national unity usually grounded in From Japan to the US, and indeed within the EU, we can presently observe the empowerment of populist, chauvinistic and xenophobic formations promoting some form of the localist slowness. In 2015 we can register a sharp increase of such cultural and political tendencies in relation to refugees seeking asylum in Europe. This is indeed accompanied by abounding regional nationalism, Islamophobia, calls for closing borders, sealing national and cultural territories and convulsive protectionism from 'the other', from the Simmelian 'stranger' (see also Bauman 1990 ).
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Those formations deploy rhetoric which is appealing to a localist mindset:
slow and sedentary practices, often rituals, associated with local ceremonies, festivities, convivial events cementing local identities, local 'totems' sustained by home-made spirits and folk costumes used as counter-punches against the alleged threat of social speed-driven dynamics of both multinational capital and displaced 12 Mass media framing indeed plays a very important role in such constructions. 13 Brexit can be understood along these lines. It partially turned into voting against 'fast-moving' migrants and EU politics and for 'slow' protectionism and isolationism of the UK, and local decisionmaking capacity in an economic, cultural and political sense.
persons. I am not suggesting that local slow traditionalism is reducible to such an interpretative framework (tradition also works as a strong social bond: carnivals can be subversive and liberating as we know from Bakhtin), but I rather highlight its potentially dangerous and undemocratic edge. Furthermore, the convulsive advocacy and campaigning for the local, the provincial, the parochial, the authentic, the traditional and the like is arguably underpinned by flawed, or at least incomplete and far too emotionally charged interpretations of social speed. That is so for two reasons.
First, the imaginary of the external fast world as threat is sustained by the common -and largely incorrect -perception of social speed. In public discourseand academic discourse too -social speed is often represented as something homogeneous, with fixed logic and, importantly, as something distinctively negative and oppressive -usually as a part of some looming emergency or 'ticking bomb' (Glezos 2012 : 10-42) we need protection from. As many commentators remind us, social acceleration -despite being inscribed in the logic of modernization -is not only inherently uneven and relational, but also dramatically heterogeneous. Different relevant sociological variables -gender, class, ethnicity, profession, age -enter into the experience and workings of the acceleration dynamic. In other words, social acceleration is asymmetrically distributed and manifests differently in different social arenas. Second, acceleration is a deeply modernist and progressive principle -as Koselleck (2004: 12, 24, 42) Moreover, it is not uncommon that many scientists consider slowness a regressive principle -scientific conduct, after all, needs to 'keep up' with the world it investigates while, of course, maintaining some sort of delaying tactic in organized critical reflection and analysis. Sluggishness, inability to proceed, to progress, to produce (e.g. texts, experimental results) is not something desirable and appreciated in the academic and scientific environments. The same is valid for the notoriously slow pace of academic publishing and the relative frustration it often generates, especially in this digitally savvy age:
The slow pace of academic publishing is often painful to witness, particularly for the 21st century, when everyone is used to the nearly-immediate broadcasting of everything. Academic systems of appraisal, promotion and research funding allocation also define hectic schedules, and the competition between highly-qualified candidates is ferocious. The traditional submission to publication times in the arts and humanities is increasingly unfit for the purpose of addressing the increasing pressures by funders and Higher Education employers for researchers to "perform" and have "impact". (In the case of scholars working on themes and methodologies that are always changing, the slow pace is indeed counterproductive and might jeopardize the quality and relevance of the research once it finally gets published.) Current technologies enable, up to a certain extent, faster editorial workflows, but publishing and communication technologies also play a role in increasing the already heavy workload of many academics (Priego 2013 ).
The heavy workload Priego refers to is often accompanied by more positive experiences of speed in academic life. On a more phenomenological-psychological level, academics and scientists often embrace a number of what we might call 'moments of fruitful acceleration'. These are mostly associated with discovery, brainstorming, aha-moments, eureka moments. Many also equate acceleration with intuition, which cannot be taken as basis for scientific work, but as Bachelard (2002) indirectly notes, can serve as the main impetus for further -and perhaps slower and reflective -scientific practices. Perhaps iconically, we can say that Archimedes in the bathtub and Newton under the tree experienced a 'moment of fruitful acceleration' of their trains of thought. Moreover, and in a more practical sense, due to the dramatic proliferation of fast research engines and other scholarly Internet tools the 'access to scholarly information and research results has never been easier; and thanks to the vast computational power now readily available, whole new areas of scholarly investigation have been opened up (Levy 2007: 237) . In recent years, fast social media such as Twitter have turned out to be very productive and practical instruments In #ACCELERATE MANIFESTO for an Accelerationist Politics (Williams & Srnicek 2014) 14 , accelerationism is traced as far back in time as to Marx. Moreover, accelerationist thought underpinned by accepting the interconnectedness of technological edifice and economic system maintains that [t] he speculative extrapolation of the machine process, the affirmation that this process is inextricably social, technical and epistemic; the questioning of its relation to capitalism, the indifferent form of exchange-value and its corrosion of all previous social formation and subjective habits; and its effect upon culture and the new possibilities it opens up for the human conceived not as eternal given, fated to suffer the vicissitudes of nature, but as a historical being whose relation to nature (including its own), increasingly mediated through technical means, is mutable and in motion (Mackay & Avanessian 2014: 11) .
14 It can be characterized as a leftist political proclamation conceptualizing social progress beyond 'traditional critiques and regressive, declarative or restorative "solutions"' (Mackay & Avanessian 2014: 7).
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The crucial principle for accelerationists thus lies in an attempt of 'reshaping and repurposing (rather than rejecting) the technologies that are the historical product of capitalism' (Mackay & Avanessian 2014: 23) . One of the most important points this body of thought makes -as well as an argument upon which its critique of capitalism is grounded -is that present capitalist logic sustained by neoliberal rationality is no longer a dynamic or progressive force but a deeply regressive one (leaving aside the question if it ever was and, for the moment, its unintended environmental and psychological consequences). Accelerationists also profess criticism towards contemporary and dominant left political discourse which, according to them, is technologically illiterate, overly 'metaphysical' in nature (many radical leftist thinkers and movements maintain that there is some kind of 'outside' of capitalism), characterized by defeatism, inertia and parochial quarrels.
Glezos (2012) offers a similar, yet considerably more sensitive 'way out' of the acceleration vs slowness dilemma. However, his interpretation is far from conceiving it as an agency-less mega-force of modernity, but, in addition to being a threat, speed is also an opportunity to be embraced and tailored to democratic praxis. (2012: 89) . In other words, the use of fast ICTs could be redirected to democratic practice and 'liberated' from their commodity status.
Glezos's point holds even more acute, if slightly problematic, once we yield to the interconnectedness of technological progress and capitalist rationality.
Despite this position being generally sympathetic in its overall ambitions of embracing the present technological possibilities for emancipatory purposes, its aim omits the very fact that the technologies we use never operate in a social vacuum and are always integral to the workings of socio-economic reproduction mechanisms. Noys (2014) argues that accelerationists, for instance, in a strange way resemble a hybrid of the Futurists and Soviet communists in how they integrate forces of capitalist production as forces of their own destruction. The question thus remains as to whether radical inequalities and other integral pathologies of capitalism will be 'taken with' the utopian anticipations of those embracing technological accelerationit is very difficult to dissociate unintended implications of capitalist system and its technological makeup. The main problem therefore seems to be the inextricable link between capital accumulation and technological development. The practical enactment accelerationist scenario is (and will probably remain) barely possible beyond the level of conceptual imagination: it would be difficult to 'destroy' (via repurposing) capitalism by accelerating its negative tendencies -alienation, inequalities, inhumanities and the like -without destroying not only the technological infrastructure but much more. Rather than the accelerationist scenario it might be more useful as well as practical to explore the -slightly more realistic -possibilities associated with the notion of a 'post-growth' society (see Rosa et al 2016) and render the 'dimension of time as a starting point for the "pacification"' (Rosa et al 2016: 17) of crises of capitalist modernity.
Conclusion: towards a normative ambiguity
There is little doubt that social acceleration accounts for significant motion in modernity. Yet the dynamics of social acceleration itself as well as reactions to it are far from even and one-dimensional. The ambivalent view of speed and slowness advanced in this article builds and adds to the existing debates of social acceleration by developing a nuanced critical account of slowness. The main aim of this line of inquiry is to stress the ambiguity inherent to slowness that has so far remained overlooked in the scholarship on the slow that, more often than not, tends to embrace slowness unreservedly. The fast (bad) vs slow (good) dichotomy seems now to be an emerging dualism in debates around social temporality where the slow is often advocated as a solution. By advancing my analysis I strived to problematize this perspective and stressed questionable aspects associated with the mushrooming slow discourse. I am not rejecting the slow altogether, but rather critically highlighting its other, relatively sidelined, dimensions.
Some acceleration commentators say that slowness proper can be approximated only if the character of capitalism changes (Connolly 2002 ). This, we know, remains one of the most challenging problems of contemporary social and political thought. Slow living initiatives seem to have so far failed in achieving such goals beyond affecting individualized lifestyles of fragmented groups of people; slowness can also be a rather dangerous component of localist and undemocratic political agendas; many individuals prefer and welcome acceleration rather than slowness in their ways of living and working. Even if these barriers are somehow overcome, the return to some kind of slow world still appears as a restoration of the pre-modern configuration. On the other hand, accelerationist politics and embracing ICT-driven acceleration possibilities remain inherently problematic. Is an acceleration-less modern condition even desirable, given acceleration's modernist connection with emancipation, self-determination and self-empowerment? Is it not the case that both acceleration and slowness deliver comforts and conveniences?
Shouldn't we begin to think beyond the dichotomy of fast and slow as Hsu (2015) suggests and perhaps establish an idea of time autonomy as a serious matter for political, ethical and psychological discussion? This might be a minor, yet first necessary step towards the opening up of the conditions of possibility of how to articulate a way out of the apparent deadlock of oppressive and detrimental social acceleration on the one hand, and the notion of slowness which so far ceases to account for progressive social principles on the other. In light of these observations it might be productive to begin to think about the 'normative ambiguity' of both fast and slow, which also characterizes many other important concepts in social theory (see Pels 1998) . It is probably difficult, if not impossible, to argue for an essentialist or linear theory of fast and slow because their positive and negative aspects are invariably tied together (e.g. duration, demanding time, taking time are not necessarily synonymous to being slow and might comprise 'fast moments'). Rather than absolutism of either/or we might approach the dichotomy with epistemological moderation: due to their normative ambiguity neither slow nor fast can be preferred as universal solutions.
